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Abstract 
 
On the ground of numerous archive documents and literature the paper provides consideration of the attitudes of different social 
and professional population groups to protest movement of Russian miners during transition to market relations. The stages are 
determined; their common and different features are analyzed. The reasons and factors of contradictory relations of Russians to 
protests of miners are demonstrated, as well as their connection with domestic and foreign policy processes. The struggle of coal 
industry workers for consolidation of their positions in such an important sphere as public opinion is characterized. The forms of 
worker and retired employer solidarity are determined. A comparative analysis of attitudes and actions of population to miners’ 
protest movement is carried out and the period of “perestroika” and “shock therapy” are considered. While mass and radical 
protesting the increasing international solidarity with actions of Russian coal industry workers is emphasized. The activities of 
bodies of power aimed at decreasing of miners’ movement authority in the society are revealed. The key reasons of negative 
dynamics in public attitude to miners’ protest are studied. A conclusion as made that the negatively changing public attitude to 
miners’ protest was one of factors influencing on its dynamic decline.  
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1. Introduction 
 
With significant moral support and financial backing of strike movement by soviet workers in 1989 miners could 
become an important power basis of opposition socio-political forces. However, in the subsequent years, the citizens 
of the Soviet Union changed their attitude to their regular strikes. Someone considered these strikes as a threat to 
economic and political stability that is why they appealed to the strikers including their representative bodies and 
asked to cease the strikes immediately (Lopatin, 1993). The leaders of miners’ movement saw changing confidence 
of population as agony of conservative and communist forces and didn’t pay much attention to it. The political 
success by B. Yeltsin in 1991 filled the miners with the confidence in understanding by public at large. The promises 
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of new Russian governing bodies and heartfelt expectations of lots of population created hope of consolidation 
between the government and the society necessary for solution of key problems in economic and social spheres.  
The USSR disintegration and a new vector of statehood development fundamentally changed the principles of 
labor movement. The public opinion gained a great significance during the transition to democracy and market 
relations because miners quickly realized their “solitary” position in the system of political relations. In new liberal 
conditions they could be supported only by the same workers as they were. Miners’ struggle benefited from the fact, 
that “shock therapy” had caused a considerable impoverishment of various strata of society in the country, initiated 
the development of protest movement of workers and pensioners in different forms.  
The attitude of miners to the society also changed in new conditions of struggle. They began to look for new 
“points” of public dissatisfaction, representing the interests of vast social groups. These “points” were as follows: the 
events in October 1993, the first Chechen campaign, financial default and others. In fact, this position was often 
successful and made miners more authoritative. When any problem was solved by the Kremlin, miners’ actions 
automatically started losing their popularity.  
As the confrontation between the coal mining industry workers and the government was growing, the necessity of 
support from the ordinary people increased. The reaction of workers and pensioners was an indicator of the state of 
protest movement, which determined claims, forms and methods of miners’ struggle. Among others the following 
parameters were important for the complex characteristic of public opinion: participation in joint protests, 
sympathetic actions of miners with workers and pensioners, demonstration of ideological closeness with miners by 
mass media, financial support and moral sympathy. 
National solidarity with miners enjoyed its ups and downs those years. Market relations changed public 
conscience, intensified the contradictoriness of public attitudes to social and political processes, including forms and 
methods of struggle. Worsening economy, rising social differentiation, and competition made people consider 
miners’ protest movement in a new way. In the period under consideration the labor class – the main support of 
miners – was subject to serious changes. First, de-industrialization of the country and widening spheres of economic 
activities resulted in significant fall of specific weight of workers in social and professional structure of new Russia. 
Second, the labor class became more uncoordinated and “self-seeking”, and its behavior depended on their special, 
first of all, financial interests (Voejkov, 2008). The concept “solidarity of workers” lost its value and gave place to 
the concept “market competition”. Therefore, even at peaks of miners’ protest activity they were supported by 
employees of government-financed organizations but not by workers.   
The key reasons of negative public attitude to protests of miners are as follows: 1) contradicting results of strike 
movement during the “perestroika” years; 2) lack of confidence in serious results of struggle due to the spontaneous 
character of protest movement, non-availability of clear program of actions and forceful leaders; 3) difficult 
economic consequences of protest actions in conditions of national economy crisis; 4) the difference in living 
standards as compared with population of more successful subjects of Russian Federation; 5) fear of possible 
cataclysms in the society; 6) criticism of protests in mass media controlled by the government of Russian Federation. 
Public displeasure was the most significant when all of the mentioned above reasons occurred in a complex.  
Generally speaking, the attitude of different social and professional groups to miners’ protest during transition to 
the market had several periods in their evolution. The first phase covers the period of 1992 – 1996, when public 
opinion tended to support protests, including illegal ones. The second phase (1997 – 1998, July) was a culmination of 
support of miners’ struggle by workers and pensioners. The third one (1998, August – 1999) was a period when 
public opinion about miners’ protests got a negative character.  
 
2. The first phase (1992 – 1996)  
 
During the first phase public attitude was evolving from criticism of some protests of miners to mass support of 
their struggle against B. Yeltsin’s policy. However, this process had a diverse character. During the first years of 
“shock therapy” the most workers and miners had significantly conflicting views on such important issues as reasons 
of worsening social and economic situation in the country, goals and objectives of protest movement, position and 
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importance of “labor class vanguard” in social and political life of the country. As soon as the positions of miners 
were agreed with the approaches of the majority of population a reciprocal social and political interest showed up.  
The society got displeased by the results of “shock therapy” much earlier than B. Yeltsin expected. His constant 
promises to improve life of ordinary people were not substantiated by real actions. The most population of the 
country opposed an extortionate liberalization of prices in its first months. Meanwhile, the workers and pensioners 
became aware of worsening social and economic situation, as well as they realized such political loses as the USSR 
disintegration, lowering international reputation of the country, restricted opportunities for workers to be in the 
bodies of state power. It was the miners who were considered as people responsible for these problems because they 
put their strike movement on a wide scale and influenced on the system crisis in 1989 – 1991.  
The coal mining industry workers demonstrated the silent agreement with B. Yeltsin’s – their political idol – 
policy. The most part of population was annoyed and caused the further growth of anti-miners attitude even among 
workers. The criticism of perestroika miners’ movement by the mass media in the 1990-s confirmed the changing 
public attitudes. The criticism was demonstrated primarily on local and regional levels and then on All-Russian scale.  
No joint protest actions confirmed the real crisis in relations of miners with other social and professional groups at 
the beginning of the period under consideration. It is necessary to mention that in 1992 miners’ protests were 
organized by separate enterprises, while other workers organized mass actions to struggle for their claims. Protest 
“backwardness” of coal mining industry workers opposed them to employees of other branches of Russian economy 
and the government-financed organizations.  
The significant growth of Russian miners’ protest movement in the mid 1990-s represented mostly by strike 
struggle didn’t mean the over-all support. At the time the society was split in supporters and opponents of suspicion 
of industrial processes. In new market conditions strikes and other protests weren’t as efficient as they were in times 
of command economy. Miners’ strikes caused economic losses of their enterprises and other subjects involved in 
business activity in coal mining regions as well as in the whole country. Therefore, there were a lot of opponents of 
strike struggle among employees of the government-financed organizations and workers of other branches of 
economy. In these conditions miners had to change strategy and tactics of protest movement, orientate to more 
“painless” for population forms and methods of struggle, for example “underground” and hunger strikes. It didn’t 
solve the problems which were to be solved by protest movement.  
We can’t say that the Russians criticized miners since the first days of “shock therapy” and were displeased by 
them. Public opinion started supporting miners’ struggle since 1992 due to objective and subjective factors. Miners 
improved the public attitude to them because they reconsidered their positions both to the domestic policy of the 
Kremlin and everybody who disagreed with the results of “shock therapy”. They also changed the position to their 
own protests. The system of values was changed, first of all – the results of strike movement in 1989 – 1991. Self-
criticism grew and demonstrated a new concept of miners’ struggle to the society of Russia. Such “repentance” was 
welcomed and influenced on closer moral and real relations of miners with other workers.  
The necessity of ideological solidarity of common people with miners was caused by objective resistance to the 
methods of “shock therapy”. Workers, employees of government-financed organizations, farmers and pensioners 
couldn’t overcome the difficulties highlighted in their own protests; they didn’t have reliable fighting partners ready 
to battle for their interests on the level of the President and government of Russian Federation. They were not as 
experienced in battling for their economic and political claims as miners were. Hence, in the mid 1990-s nothing 
could stop different groups of workers to support each other in the struggle against unpopular reforms. In 1996 the 
coal-mining industry workers were again in the vanguard of labor class.  
Public support of miners’ protests had various forms. The most significant one was participation of workers and 
pensioners in joint protests: strikes, pickets, demonstrations, meetings. The joint protests rallied common people, 
demonstrated their not indifferent attitude to the crisis in economy and social sphere of the country, and initiated 
setting up collective claims.  
Unassisted protests of workers were of the same significance, similar claims were put forward. Employees of 
government-financed organizations, primarily teachers, were the most active fighters against anti-popular reforms in 
the 1990-s. Any rebellion was important for miners, because it demonstrated the systematic failures in the policy of 
the Kremlin both in the area of coal-mining industry and other branches of economy.  
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Protest actions of miners, especially radical ones provoked interest of mass media. The most stories and articles 
focused on the situation in the coal-mining industry of the country demonstrated quite naturally the dissatisfaction of 
workers and influenced on the public opinion, primarily in coal-mining regions.  
Problems in coal-mining industry and decline of living standards of Russian miners worried both Russian and foreign 
public. Foreign journalists, especially in 1994 helped to consolidate international solidarity with miners, including the 
official authorities (Vavilova, 1994). Letters and telegrams were received from different countries, especially from 
those where trade unions were significant participants in the system of social and labor relations – Germany, 
Belgium, the USA, Canada, Japan, Greece and Italy. The support by such reputable organizations as International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Miners’ International Federation was extremely important for miners.  
Moral assistance of miners’ protest was the most wide-spread form of the public support. Against the insufficient 
historical experience of collective protests for labor laws and interests, the laws of capitalism forced creation of new 
values; individualism was the most important one. However, it was not the only reason why people didn’t want to 
take part in joint protest actions, but it was the most evident. Among the reasons there were also objective ones – not 
all subjects of Russian Federation were closely engaged in coal-mining, therefore it was difficult to demonstrate a 
real solidarity. 
Thereby, miners could raise their authority over Russian and international public during the first phase. It was a factor of 
further growth of their protest activity, and consolidation of their importance in social and political processes in Russia.  
 
3. The second phase (1997 – 1998, July)  
Presidential elections in 1996 disappointed millions of Russians because economy and social sphere didn’t change 
for the better. The public didn’t have illusions anymore, that everything would improve. In the following year and a 
half the country was paralyzed by the system crisis, and B. Yeltsin was not to be trusted by the Russians. Coal mining 
regions didn’t have any confidence in the policy of the Kremlin (In Zapoljar'e, 1998). It was the period of the 
strongest protest public opinion of Russians who supported the struggle of miners a lot.  
Participation of representatives of different social and professional groups in miners’ protests was the most 
significant evidence of public support during the second phase of protests. The fact that workers and pensioners 
jointed to their radical and illegal protest actions inspired miners enormously. The number of supporters increased 
substantially during difficult and critical periods of confrontation, characterized by the fear of using force against 
miners. The most dramatic events of the second phase fell on the period of All-Russian “rail wars” in May, 1998, 
when miners unanimously put forward the claims relevant for most Russians. Various social and professional groups 
participating in “rail wars” made this action dynamic, large-scale and forceful.  
Independent mass protests of Russians were a less radical but rather convincing way to support miners’ protests. 
Some actions of workers especially in May 1998 were those of many thousands and had a broad geography. 
Financial assistance was also very important for protesting miners support. It was given mainly by local residents 
although other regions also supplied support. This support was more significant, when miners’ actions were slow and 
exhausting, for example during the “rail wars” and the picket near the House of the Government of Russian 
Federation. Even small and medium sized business provided financial support.  
The second phase was also distinguished mainly by moral support to the protest actions of picketers. It became 
more significant during the All-Russian protest action on rails in May 1998. According to the data of All-Russian 
survey, approximately 50 – 60% of population approved blocking railways by miners despite the difficulties it made 
for population (Gordon, Klopov, 2001). Among people approving “rail wars” there were those who suffered from 
picketers’ actions. People tried to respect miners’ claims and to support them (Smyslenko, 1998). 
Solidarity with miners was demonstrated not only in silent compassion, but in real actions aimed at supporting 
their “fighting spirit”. While miners were organizing their protests children and veterans were making concerts for 
them, they were sent letters and telegrams to, a lot of newspapers published articles supporting “fair claims” 
(Arhipov, 1998).  
The high level of protest was clearly demonstrated in mass media. Russian miners received letters from the USA, 
Canada, Japan and other countries. The popularity of Russian “rail wars” participants in May, 1998, increased the 
solidarity with them by all opposition parties of the country, and caused the support of heir actions by foreign 
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opposition and organization of human rights protection. The struggle on the rails was supported by International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions and in resolutions of Syria, Greece and Italy communist parties (State records of 
Kemerovo region. Fond 1311). 
During the second phase miners attracted attention to themselves by active self-criticism of the measures they 
took while striking in 1989–1991. It was mainly shown in local and regional mass media (articles and photos), and in 
leaflets distributed by miners. Meanwhile, the second phase of miners’ protests was characterized by important 
change of public support. The start of this change goes back to summer 1998. The negative attitude to miners’ 
protests was developed slowly and primarily related to actions with considerable damaging effect. As the result of 
All-Russian “rails wars” both coal mining regions of Russia and a lot of innocent people suffered from economic 
losses in May 1998.  
Protest feeling of miners also changed. In July 1998 only Kuzbass miners blocked the Trans-Siberian Railway. 
Although the government of Russian Federation was slow in implementing of made decisions, miners of Pechora 
coal basin and those of Russian Donbass were not interested in radical forms of struggle anymore.  
Protest movement of miners was powerful against other destabilizing factors. There is no doubt, that in May – 
July 1998 the country faced the revolutionary situation.  A lot of people were aware of it and were afraid of serious 
social cataclysms (Serebrjannikov, 1998). The situation was alike that of the end of 1980-s – beginning of 1990-s. 
People thought that miners fought for better way of development, but in fact we lost the country, national economy 
was damaged, living standards worsened significantly, the democracy provoked a lot of questions. That’s why the 
Russians were on the look-out to miners’ protests.  
Alongside with the criticism and self-criticism of strikes in 1989 – 1991 miners and supporting them people found 
essential differences of labor movement of the time with that of the 1990-s. During “shock therapy” miners’ struggle 
wasn’t so organized, large-scaled and attracting attention to itself as that of perestroika. Miners didn’t have 
recognized leaders, definite program of actions and class solidarity. As the consequence many Russians didn’t 
believe in success of miners’ protest movement in new political and economic conditions of country development.  
Moreover, miners’ protests had negative results. Employees of the Trans-Siberian Railways were made the most 
indignant by these protests in 1998. In their claims they regularly emphasized negative results of “rails wars” for 
passengers. In May 1998 the railways workers tried to convince the picketers using the words, but in July of the same 
year they “protected their place of work from picketers’ attempts to block the goods traffic” (Fomicheva, 1998). In 
general, even at the peak of protest movement the solidarity with miners had a declarative character; it didn’t seem as 
support of the whole nation. Protesting miners couldn’t show themselves as a single whole and a power able to raise 
population for struggle.  
 
4. The third phase (August 1998 – 1999) 
The All-Russian protest on the rails in May 1994 couldn’t implement radical claims of miners despite of its 
dimensions (resignation of the government and the President, nationalization of coal-mining industry). On the 
contrary a lot of Russians saw these political claims as an additional key factor to influence on the government and to 
get back salary debts. The mass protest wasn’t finished logically, common interests weren’t asserted sequentially, 
there was no solidarity in the branch, economy of the country was damaged – all this cardinally changed the attitude 
of Russians to miners’ protests.  
In May – July 1998 public opinion about miners’ protest differs a lot, but since August of the same year it became 
clearly negative. Miners’ attempts to act as a single force able to represent interests of the most working population 
didn’t succeed. Their numerous protests in August – October 1998, including the mass picket at the House of the 
Government, were less popular. The Russian society principally denied mass and large protests as a measure to solve 
social and labor conflicts (Anisimova, 2004).  
Public opinion was significantly changed by miners themselves who denied the rationality of protests in 
conditions of developing liberal political and economic relations. Financial default in Russia in 1998 made this 
attitude even stronger. Coal mining industry workers were looking for independent ways to overcome crisis and keep 
their jobs more thoroughly. The level of public confidence of Russians to miners’ protests was drastically falling and 
the problem of economic future became evident. Therefore, the authorities of coal-mining regions intensified 
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measures against protests and for protection of social and economic stability. The key factor in falling popularity of 
miners’ struggle was activity of mass media.  
Since August 1998 mass media attacked miners criticizing “rails wars” as a form of protest (Amelin, 1998). The 
society had a hard position necessitating legal methods of social and economic problems solution. Even the subject of 
miners’ protests was forced out of mass media.  
Negative attitude to miners’ protests was also influenced by measures to overcome crisis taken by all executive 
authorities and subjects of economic activity of the country. The level of public confidence to the policy of the 
Kremlin started increasing in autumn 1998 when coal-mining industry was first supported by the “pink” government 
headed by E.M. Primakov. At the end of 1998 collective struggle was replaced by separate and short-termed protests. 
Since then workers and pensioners came to nothing more than moral support of legal methods of miners’ struggle.  
The year 1999 was also distinguished by that trend. Public opinion was in favor of legal methods of fighting for 
social and economic interests. At the same time, miners couldn’t find a point of mass dissatisfaction of the policy of 
Russian Federation. Declining protest activity was typical both for miners and other social and professional groups. 
Since 1999 mass media didn’t pay much attention to protests of Russian miners despite being resonance of some of 
them. During the last phase miners didn’t have any financial support moral solidarity started falling. Changing public 
opinion about miners’ protests was one of the factors of their dynamic decline.  
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